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What is Carnap’s legacy for the contemporary metaontological debate? Already a cursory 
examination of recent metaontological literature suggests that Carnap’s influence has been great, 
when it comes to understanding what the relevant theoretical options are. Chalmers (2009), Price 
(2009) and Yablo (1998) all present Carnap as the hero for those dismissive of the enterprise of 
ontology; Hirsch (2005), Dorr (2005) and Sider (2001) all focus on specific views dismissive of 
ontology which they call Carnapian; Wilson’s (2011) critical notice of Chalmers, Manley and 
Wasserman (2009) is largely focused on Carnap’s influence. 
I will here approach the issue of Carnap’s legacy by bringing up a number of themes from 
Carnap and a number of themes from contemporary ontology – or rather, from contemporary 
metaontology – making a number of remarks on each, concerning the extent to the themes clearly 
from Carnap still are relevant today and the extent to which themes clearly central today really can be 
found in Carnap. In sections 1-3, I discuss theses arguably found in Carnap and the extent to which 
they are found in the contemporary debate. In sections 4-6, I discuss theses found in the 
contemporary discussion and discuss the extent to which they are found in Carnap. While the picture 
that emerges is somewhat nuanced, the overall conclusion can perhaps be summarized as follows: 
Carnap’s importance for contemporary ontology is overstated; and to the extent that some 
contemporary themes are found already in Carnap, the contemporary discussions are just as 
problematic as Carnap’s own discussions were. 
 
1. External and internal questions 
One Carnapian idea that is often referred to in the contemporary discussion is the distinction 
between external and internal questions. Let me first discuss how that distinction of Carnap’s should 
be understood, and then discuss what contemporary metaontologists say. (The discussion to follow 
owes much to my (2009) and especially my (2013).) 
Let me start with what should be uncontroversial. Carnap’s view on ontology is somehow 
skeptical or deflationary: the questions which philosophers concerned with ontology have been 
concerned with are, somehow or other, non-questions.1 However, Carnap not only dismisses 
                                                      
1 Carnap (1950), e.g. p. 207. 
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ontological questions, but also presents a positive view of some sort concerning what ontological 
questions are like. Central to the positive view is a distinction between internal and external questions, 
and the notion of frameworks.2 Internal questions – questions internal to frameworks – including 
questions raised using the same forms of words as philosophers use to raise the ontological questions 
they are concerned with, are perfectly straightforward and non-problematic. External questions – 
questions external to frameworks – are in bad standing, insofar as they are conceived of as genuinely 
factual. These questions can be taken to be all right, but only when they are taken as pragmatic 
questions.  
Carnap’s distinction between internal and external questions is a distinction between questions 
internal and external to frameworks; so in Carnap, the distinction is bound up with the notion of a 
framework. Somehow the problematic nature of external questions is related to their being external 
to frameworks. But what are frameworks supposed to be? Let me discuss two views on the matter 
that may with some justice be proposed.  
First, there is the language pluralist interpretation. On the language pluralist interpretation, the 
‘frameworks’ are simply languages, or language-fragments, and the only framework-relativity at issue 
is the familiar one of sentence-meaning to language. (One and the same sentence, non-semantically 
individuated, can have different meanings in different languages.) On this view, it is straightforward 
that there are frameworks; the main question rather concerns how appeal to frameworks can pack 
any sort of philosophical punch. On a second, relativist, understanding of Carnap’s notion of a 
framework, ‘frameworks’ are not mere language-fragments; instead, frameworks are the sorts of 
things relativists appeal to – something like perspectives or outlooks. Framework-relativity is not the 
trivial dependence of meaning upon language. Instead, the propositions that the sentences express are 
not true or false absolutely but only relative to frameworks. The potential significance of appeal to 
frameworks is clear given the relativist understanding, but the ideas appealed to are obviously quite 
controversial. 
On the language pluralist understanding of Carnap, the distinction between internal and external 
questions amounts to the following. Internal questions are questions raised using a particular 
language. The sentence “there are numbers”, non-semantically individuated, is part of many different 
possible languages and its truth-value is relative to the language employed. We can also ask which 
language is the most useful to employ: this is a pragmatic external question. But it is clear why there 
can be no such thing as a factual external question: when the language pluralist insists that external 
questions understood as factual questions are non-questions, what she insists is simply that whenever 
we ask questions we do that using some language or other. One would only ask a factual external 
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question if, absurdly, one attempted to stand outside of language. On the relativist interpretation, the 
picture is the following. An internal question is a question of what is true relative to some framework 
in this demanding sense of ‘framework’. An external question is a question of what framework is the 
correct one. The relativist holds that this question lacks an answer if understood as a question about 
matters of fact. What can be meaningfully asked is which framework is more useful for a given 
purpose. Given the relativist interpretation of ‘framework’, there can genuinely be both platonist and 
nominalist frameworks. 
To further illustrate the difference between language pluralism and relativism, consider the 
application of these views to the dispute between platonists and nominalists. The language pluralist 
may stress that sentences that are the focus of ontological controversy, such as “there are numbers”, 
will come out true in some possible language and false in another, and that the decision to affirm this 
sentence can be bound up with the decision to use this possible language. In some sense there are 
platonist and nominalist languages. But the ‘in some sense’ is important, for it is not as if platonism – 
the proposition that there are abstract entities – comes out true in some languages and untrue in others. 
The truth-value of a proposition, as opposed to a (non-semantically individuated) sentence, does not 
vary from language to language. Of course talk of languages as platonist and nominalist must then be 
treated with a large pinch of salt, and it is not immediately clear why there being platonist and 
nominalist languages in this obviously attenuated sense should be thought relevant to anything. By 
contrast, the relativist can speak of genuinely platonist and nominalist frameworks. A platonist 
framework is one relative to which the propositions that express platonism are true and a nominalist 
framework is one relative to which the propositions that express nominalism are true. 
As already stressed, the central claims of language pluralism are rather trivial. How can they even 
be relevant to skepticism about ontology? Obviously language pluralism needs to be supplemented to 
be so relevant – but how exactly? Here is one suggestion. Carnap’s criticism of ontology can perhaps 
be understood as follows: While ‘there are’-questions can be sensibly raised, and answered, within 
various languages, ontologists approach their questions in such a way that they must be understood 
as raising external questions and treating them as factual, even while factual external questions fail to 
make sense. Here is an illustration, using the same example as earlier. Suppose one of us speaks a 
language where “there are numbers” is true and the other speaks a language where “there are 
numbers” comes out false, and that we come to find out that it is so. Then I go on to say “OK, 
‘there are numbers’ comes out true in my language and false in yours. But, language-independently, are 
there numbers?”. This would be odd. What could this supposed further question amount to? Of 
course, if F-discourse is about something language-independent, and “there are Fs” comes out true in 
my language, then so does “language-independently, there are Fs”. Imagining that there is a further 
question there, not trivially answered by what has already been established, would be confused. 
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Carnap’s charge could be that ontologists are trying to ask this wrong-headed question. The only 
‘further’ question here is a pragmatic one: which language is it, for certain practical purposes, best to 
use?3 That is a pragmatic external question. For future reference, let us label questions like the 
supposed further question confused questions. For the envisaged criticism of ontology to be effective it 
would of course have to be shown that the questions ontologists ask really are confused questions in 
the sense characterized. It is not clear how plausible this is, or how one might go about arguing the 
point. Just to make clear the relation between different points here: On the language pluralist 
interpretation, Carnap’s ‘frameworks’ are language-fragments. Moreover, the framework-relativity 
(that is, ordinary language-relativity) of ontological sentences is, somehow, central to a critique of the 
ontological enterprise. I have further presented one critique of ontology – the critique that 
ontological questions are confused questions – for which the framework-relativity of ontological 
sentences is thus central. But I don’t take language pluralism to be committed to this particular way 
of criticizing the enterprise of ontology. 
I think that if indeed some sort of appeal to framework-relativity is central to Carnap’s view on 
ontology (as I will get to shortly, there are complications), we obviously face the question of what the 
frameworks are, and while there are other questions to be asked, all interpretations will make Carnap 
a language pluralist or a relativist. Either way something quite radical, and quite distinctive to Carnap, 
is going on. I also think that of the two interpretations discussed, the language pluralism 
interpretation is much more reasonable than the relativist one.4 
How does Carnap’s actual external/internal distinction compare with the allusions to this 
distinction in the contemporary ontological debate? In his (2005), Thomas Hofweber prominently 
refers to this distinction in the course of his distinction between two types of quantification and two 
types of uses of singular terms, and his own view is explicitly modeled on Carnap’s. The idea is that 
the internal questions are those used raised using ‘internal’ – roughly, substitutional – quantification, 
and names used ‘internally’ rather than used to attempt to refer to external objects. External 
questions are raised using ‘external’ – roughly, objectual – quantification, and named used to attempt 
to refer to external objects. Stephen Yablo’s seminal (1998), arguing for a certain kind of fictionalism, 
understands ‘internal’ questions as questions asked about what’s true in the pretense and ‘external’ 
questions as questions about what is literally true. When presenting the metaontological map as he 
                                                      
3 In the text I speak of questions over which sentences are true. One may then want to object that when we are 
concerned with the existence of numbers, we are concerned with the proposition that there are numbers. 
However, focusing on propositions changes nothing essential. Corresponding to the different languages there 
are the different propositions expressed by the different sentences. Saying “OK, we know that the proposition 
expressed by ‘there are numbers’ of one language is true and the proposition expressed by ‘there are numbers’ 
of the other language is false – but is it really the case that there are numbers?” does not sound very good 
either. 
4 For further discussion of which interpretation is more reasonable, see my (forthcoming). 
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sees it, David Chalmers (2009) accords pride of place to Carnap, saying that on Carnap’s view there is 
no fact of the matter as to what is true outside of a framework and takes this as his main model of 
ontological antirealism. More generally, Chalmers draws the following distinction and does so with 
reference to Carnap: 
 
An ordinary existence assertion, to a first approximation, is an existence assertion of the sort 
typically made in ordinary first-order discussion of the relevant subject matter. For example, a 
typical mathematician’s assertion of ‘There are four prime numbers less than ten’ is an ordinary 
existence assertion, as is a typical drinker’s assertion of ‘There are three glasses on the table’. 
An ontological existence assertion, to a first approximation, is an existence assertion of the sort 
typically made in broadly philosophical discussion where ontological considerations are 
paramount. For example, a typical philosophers’ assertion of ‘Abstract objects exist’ is an 
ontological existence assertion, as is a typical philosophers’ assertion of ‘For every set of objects, 
there exists an object that is their mereological sum’.5 
 
And he notes that for many theorists writing about ontology, a distinction like this is crucial. 
Chalmers refers to Dorr (2005), Hofweber (2005), Horgan (2001), and Yablo (2000). One might add 
a number of others, including for example Sider (2009) and Cameron (2010). 
The distinction that Carnap himself draws between external and internal questions is not very 
clearly related to the distinctions one finds associated with Carnap in the literature. The general idea 
that many authors skeptical of the enterprise of ontology have found appealing is that there are two 
importantly different ways of taking questions of the form “Are there Fs?”, “Do Fs exist?”, etc. On 
one understanding, they are clearly tractable but not of relevance to what ontologists are concerned 
with. On another understanding they are properly ontological, but their tractability is something that 
can be questioned. We find versions of this in, e.g., Hofweber and Yablo. Call this the General 
Distinction. Theorists not dismissive of ontology often draw a similar distinction: on one 
understanding the questions are tractable – indeed easily resolvable – but of no concern to ontology; 
on another, they are harder but still in principle tractable, and the proper domain of ontology. Sider 
and Cameron present versions of this. 
If Carnap’s contribution was just to call attention to the General Distinction, his contribution 
would hardly be original. Surely others before him had in other terms called attention to similar 
distinctions, for example when talking about distinctions between loose talk and what is strictly 
speaking true or between speaking with the vulgar and thinking with the learned. And 
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Wittgensteinian reminders about how in philosophy language goes on holiday would be as relevant 
for the contemporary metaontologist as Carnap’s discussion.6 The specific appeal to Carnap would 
be misleading. 
As we have seen, no matter how Carnap’s distinction between internal and external is best 
understood, it involves something more specific. On either of the two interpretations mentioned 
Carnap has something much more specific in mind than the General Distinction, and something that 
contemporary ontologists are not concerned with. This is most clearly so given the relativist 
interpretation, for adherence to relativism goes beyond the General Distinction, and beyond what 
participants to the contemporary debate commit to. But I would say that also on the language 
pluralist interpretation, this is so. One complication, however, is the following. As already stressed, 
one must keep in mind that if frameworks are just languages, then it is not immediately obvious just 
how appeal to framework-relativity can be central to a critique of ontology. Somehow, language 
pluralism must be supplemented. Maybe Carnap was a language pluralist and whatever he 
supplemented it with to reach anti-ontological conclusions is something also found in the 
contemporary debate. I have presented one suggestion concerning what the supplementary 
assumptions might be – the appeal to confused questions, above – and if that suggestion is right as 
interpretation of Carnap, again Carnap is concerned with something that plays no role in the 
contemporary debate. But that suggestion was only tentative. For all I have said so far, one can think 
that there are other ways of elaborating on the basic language pluralist idea, such that there after all is 
an important continuity between what Carnap on the language pluralist interpretation can be taken to 
hold and what contemporary ontologists are concerned with. Later, when discussing semanticism 
and when discussing quantifier variance, I will return to this idea, and reject it.  
 
2. Analyticity 
Another striking feature of Carnap’s view, e.g. in (1950), is that he holds that many positive 
ontological claims are analytically true, and he also holds a view on analyticity on which analytic 
truths are somehow vacuous or metaphysically trivial. The emphasis on analyticity provides an 
alternative route to a certain kind of skepticism about the ontological enterprise. The reason 
ontological inquiry into whether – say – numbers exist is silly is that it is vacuously true that numbers 
exist. “Numbers exist” is true but does not impose any demand on reality. Investigating whether 
reality meets the demand that this sentence imposes on it is misguided, for there is no such demand. 
Of course, merely saying that some positive ontological claims are analytically true does not 
vindicate wholesale skepticism about ontology. At most what it vindicates is that in cases where the 
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claims at issue are analytically true or false, the enterprise is deflated. One could get to wholesale 
skepticism if one could argue that all ontological claims are analytically true or false. But even 
someone as liberal about analyticity as Carnap might balk at the claim that it is analytic that there are 
physical objects, let alone the claim that it is analytic that there are tables and chairs. Another, more 
plausible, way to get to wholesale skepticism via appeal to analyticity would involve saying that the 
distinctly philosophical part of an ontological dispute always turns out an analytically true or false 
claim. Carnap might hold that even if it is not analytically true that physical objects (or tables) exist, it 
can be analytically true that if such-and-such sense data obtain then physical objects (or tables) exist. 
The antecedent is not analytic; but neither is it something for philosophers qua philosophers to 
weigh in on. 
One thing to note about this analyticity-driven skepticism about ontology – call it analyticism – is 
that it seems entirely separable from any appeal to an external/internal distinction. So if Carnap can 
be said to have subscribed to analyticism, why did he also emphasize the external/internal 
distinction? Here is one possible answer to that question. An immediate objection to analyticism is 
that surely ontological questions are not that trivial, as demonstrated by the difficulties that 
ontologists dealing with them get into. To that objection, Carnap can be thought of as responding: 
the internal questions – the only sensible questions in the vicinity – are analytic; the difficulties that 
ontologists get into arise when they try to ask confused, external questions. When it seems to us that 
ontological questions both make sense and are difficult, we are conflating two types of questions, one 
type which make sense, and one which is difficult.7 
Whatever the role of analyticity in Carnap, what is the role of analyticity for contemporary 
skepticism about ontology? Appeal to analyticity has lost some of its allure since Carnap’s time. 
While reasonably many authors are still, after Quine, happy to speak of analytic or conceptual truths 
or entailments, few would assign to analyticity the central role it seems to have had for Carnap and 
some of his positivist contemporaries. However, one prominent exception to this trend is Amie 
Thomasson (e.g. 2007). Let me criticize at some length what she says about analyticity. The problems 
that Thomasson’s discussion faces are general: they are of importance for anyone who seeks to 
appeal to analyticity in an attempt to debunk ontology. 
Thomasson appeals to how truths about ordinary objects (e.g. tables) are analytically entailed by 
truths about more basic objects and their relations (e.g. simples arranged tablewise) in order to 
deflect skepticism about ordinary objects; and at a metaontological level she seeks to replace the 
dominant ontology as a substantive inquiry with a conception wherein conceptual analysis plays more 
of a role. Let me explain her strategy as applied to the problem of causal overdetermination. The 
                                                      
7 Compare here Carnap (1950), p. 209. 
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supposed problem is that where, intuitively, we would say that a window is shattered by a baseball, it 
is true to say that the window is shattered by the simples arranged baseballwise, and to posit baseballs 
in addition to these simples is to say, implausibly, that the event of the window’s shattering was 
causally overdetermined. Thomasson’s response is to say that the existence of the baseball is 
analytically entailed by the existence of the simples arranged baseballwise. If this is the case, 
Thomasson says, the existence of the baseball does not “require anything more of the world” than 
the existence of simples arranged baseballwise does, and then “there is no doubling of or 
competition between the two claims”.8 
Now, it has become common in discussions of analyticity, since Paul Boghossian’s seminal 
(1996), to distinguish between on the one hand the metaphysical idea of analyticity – the idea of 
vacuous truth or truth by virtue of meaning – and on the other hand the epistemological idea of there 
being sentences we are somehow justified in accepting solely by virtue of linguistic competence. 
Given this distinction, it is plain that one can in principle subscribe to one without subscribing the 
other. Boghossian defends the idea of epistemic analyticity while rejecting that of metaphysical 
analyticity. Thomasson’s point about the qua problem in the first instance shows that something 
about the competence of speakers helps determine reference: appeal merely to causal relations is not 
enough to determine reference.9 The discussion of the qua problem in the first instance promises to 
say something about competence and hence epistemic analyticity. But what she needs for what she 
says about causal overdetermination is metaphysical analyticity. How does she get to that? Relevant 
remarks here are the following: 
 
....analytic claims are illustrations of constitutive rules of language use. But rules are just 
disguised...commands, so insofar as they are used as illustrations of [these rules], analytic claims 
should not be understood as reports of or assertions of anything, and thus not as expressions apt 
for truth of falsehood. Instead, with their rule-demonstrating force, they should be understood 
as something like a converted command, much as demonstrations of the proper way to dance 
the merengue...10  
 
The sense in which analytic claims seem to be about the world is that they are stated in the 
object-language.... But there is another perfectly good sense in which they “say nothing” about 
                                                      
8 Thomasson (2007), p. 16. 
9 See Devitt and Sterelny (1987) for a classic presentation of this problem. 
10 Thomasson (2007), p. 69. 
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the world and are “entirely devoid of factual content”....The sense is that—if we do treat them as 
true—it is clear that their truth does not depend on any empirical fact’s obtaining.11 
 
The truth of the analytic claim, taken as a genuine description....is guaranteed given the relations 
in the rules of use for the terms employed....though the adoption of these rules is not a truth-
maker for the claim (it only establishes the meaning of the terms involved and the truth-
conditions for each part). This also makes sense of the idea that the truth of analytic claims....is 
independent of all empirical facts—even of there being bachelors or men, or indeed anything at 
all.12 
 
There are a number of different ideas suggested by these passages. In the first passage, Thomasson 
seems to suggest that analytic sentences are not truth-apt at all, being merely disguised commands. I 
am not sure how wedded she really is to this idea. But it seems problematic. Is she saying that it isn’t 
true that all bachelors are unmarried? Are there no logical truths? And won’t Frege-Geach problems 
arise for the proposal? How can it be that analytic sentences embed in the way that ordinary 
indicative sentences embed? How can they occur in valid arguments in the way that ordinary 
indicative sentences occur in valid arguments? Maybe some utterances of analytic sentences are, as 
Thomasson says, to be understood more as instructions or commands, but even so, that should not 
to be taken to mean that analytic sentences do not semantically express truth-evaluable propositions. 
Focus then on what other ideas are found in these passages. A point made in the two last passages 
quoted is that the truth of the analytic sentences is independent of any empirical fact’s obtaining. But 
emphasizing this is just a mistake. For this holds of all necessary truths, and a characterization of 
analytic truth had better distinguish between analyticity and necessity.13 
Thomasson tends to speak of analytic “claims” rather than “sentences”. For some purposes it 
might have been better to speak of sentences, and uses of sentences. The reason is that there are two 
theses in the vicinity that must be distinguished. One thesis is that analytic sentences, while in the 
indicative, have the same type of meaning as overtly prescriptive sentences – imperatives. Another 
thesis is compatible with analytic sentences having the same type of meaning as ordinary indicative 
sentences, and says only that they tend to be used to do what imperative sentences are used to do. If 
Thomasson’s thesis is the former, then, as mentioned, problems familiar from discussions of other 
                                                      
11 Thomasson (2007), p. 69f. 
12 Thomasson (2007), p. 70. 
13 Thomasson does believe in an analytic theory of necessity (with provisos necessary to accommodate a 
posteriori necessities); see especially her (2007a). But that does not make the criticism misplaced. It is one thing 
to explain all necessities by appeal to the claim that they really are analytic truths; another to just use “analytic” 
to mean what others use “necessary” to mean. Thomasson’s aim is to do the former; the charge is that what 
she actually does is the latter. 
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non-factualist theses arise. These questions may have good answers. But they are serious questions, 
and Thomasson’s discussion doesn’t help answer them. If Thomasson’s thesis instead is the latter, 
then her thesis avoids these problems. But thus understood her thesis is compatible with analytic 
sentences expressing truths, and thesis does not directly address what sorts of truths analytic 
sentences semantically express. It only says that the sentences are often not used to state the truths 
they semantically express but are used for other purposes. 
A different idea concerning metaphysical analyticity is found in the third passage above: some 
sentences are analytically true because the associated rules of use guarantee that they are true. But 
consider a criticism Boghossian makes of the metaphysical notion of analyticity. Boghossian argues 
that for any sentence S, S is true iff, for some proposition p, S means that p and p. The meaning of S 
can only help with what proposition is the meaning of S, not with the second condition, that this 
proposition be true.14 For all Boghossian says, there can be sentences that are guaranteed by the rules 
of use to express true propositions: it can be that it is guaranteed that the sentence will express some 
true proposition or other. But this alone is not enough to legitimize the notion of truth by virtue of 
meaning. Focusing on how rules of use can guarantee that an analytic sentence expresses some true 
proposition is beside the point. The real question concerns what the explanation of the truth of the 
proposition being expressed might be. 
In her (2007a) – published in (2010) – Thomasson has returned to issues surrounding analyticity 
and necessity. But that discussion faces similar problems. In a central passage, Thomasson says, 
 
…consider the analytic claim: “All bachelors are men,” or more formally, “x(BxMx).” The 
corresponding rule of use is: “apply ‘bachelor’ only where ‘man’ applies,” so the truth-conditions 
for “there is a bachelor” include that there is a man. This guarantees that if there is something 
that is a bachelor (i.e. to which ‘bachelor’ applies), then there is something that is a man (i.e. to 
which ‘man’ applies). This ensures the truth of the conditional for any substitution instance, for 
if the antecedent is true, the consequent is guaranteed to be true, given the relations in the rules 
of use for the terms employed. But actual bachelors and their features are not truth-makers for 
the claim, for the analytic claim is guaranted to be true regardless of any features of the world: it 
is vacuously true even if there are no bachelors whatsoever…Indeed, even if there is nothing in 
the world at all… the conditional claim…is true. This gives us a clear way of understanding why 
analytic claims are guaranteed to be true in a truth-conditional sense, independently of all facts 
about the world.15 
 
                                                      
14 Boghossian (1996), p. 364. 
15 Thomasson (2007a), p. 148. Again there is the talk of “analytic claims”.  
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First, there is the seeming equivocation between on the one hand speaking of analytic truths as 
guaranteed to be true and on the other hand speaking of analytic truths as vacuously true, or true 
independently of “all facts about the world”. Some pronouncements seem true of all necessary 
truths, on any view on metaphysical necessity. All necessary truths are true regardless of what contingent 
facts obtain. Others suggest the more distinctive claim that analytic truths are vacuous. As against that 
claim, Boghossian’s argument, reproduced above, is relevant. Second, the reasoning with which 
Thomasson begins only establishes that “all bachelors are men” is true since “all men are men” is, 
and that whatever the explanation is of why the latter sentence is true also explains why the former is 
true. Thomasson does not explicitly discuss “all men are men”. If, somehow, it is vacuously true, 
maybe “all bachelors are men” is so too. But if it is made true by general logical features of the world, 
then “all bachelors are men” is made true by those same features.16  
 
3. Empiricism and verificationism 
Carnap’s stance on ontological questions was clearly influenced by his empiricism and his 
verificationism. One reason why his (1950) is as unargumentative as it is, is presumably that Carnap is 
writing it for an audience that he expects to share these views, and the attendant skepticism toward 
ontology. He doesn’t defend skepticism about ontology per se so much as defend the propriety of 
speaking in a way which seems ‘ontological’, even in the face of such skepticism. 
Few authors today would say, “I am an empiricist and hence I am skeptical of ontology…”; still 
fewer would say, “I am a verificationist and hence I am skeptical of ontology…”. But one can still 
find these themes in the works of contemporary authors skeptical of ontology. Take first Eli Hirsch. 
The views associated with Hirsch will be more properly discussed in the next couple of sections. But 
briefly and roughly, one main thesis he defends is that in apparent ontological disputes, the 
disputants speak past each other. Given the principle of interpretive charity, the best way for me to 
translate an opponent involves using a ‘conciliatory’ translation scheme given which the opponent 
does not state anything that conflicts with what I say. In his (2009), John Hawthorne asks the 
pointed question of why one should not say the same in the case of theorists defending empirically 
equivalent empirical theories. Surely one can devise conciliatory translation schemes also in such 
cases, but such translation schemes would generally be taken to be incorrect – and as Hawthorne 
                                                      
16 Thomasson (2007a, p. 146) is explicit that she does not present an account of logical necessity. But my point 
is that since she does not do so, she does not show that “all bachelors are men” expresses something vacuously 
true. (I also want to add a remark on the example. Thomasson makes her point using a universal generalization, 
and if there are no bachelors there is a sense in which the sentence is ‘vacuously’ true. Thomasson seems to 
want to use this to support her view on analytic truths. But this should not be taken to be a compelling 
argument for taking analytic, or generally necessary, truths to be vacuous, for example because “all bachelors 
are tidy”, surely a synthetic sentence, is also such that if there were nothing at all in the world, it would be true.) 
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stresses, Hirsch would not disagree.17 But how can Hirsch treat the cases differently? As Hawthorne 
mentions, Hirsch stresses the apriority and necessity of ontological claims, and Hawthorne says, 
“[Hirsch’s] idea seems to be that we should, in translation, give special respect to claims that 
communities regard as a priori and necessary, and that this lends itself to conciliatory translation 
schemes in the case of endurantists and perdurantists but not in the case of those empirically 
equivalent theories where the relevant bits of theory are not regarded as a priori and necessary”.18  
Why does Hirsch think that claims regarded as a priori and necessarily true have this special 
status? Here is a natural hypothesis: while Hirsch does not speak of analyticity he is thinking of a 
priori necessary truths as analytic, and that is why he thinks what he does. Underlying what Hirsch 
says is an aversion to the idea of substantive a priori truths. 
Let me elaborate. Hirsch stresses that charity in interpretation involves not taking the interpretee 
to reject what one finds obvious. This means according a special status to the truths one regards as a 
priori and necessary, if one takes these truths to be obvious. There are certainly different possible 
reasons one might have for taking them to be obvious. But one very prominent kind of view on 
which such truths have this kind of status is one on which they have such a status because of being 
analytic. 
This hypothesis about Hirsch receives support from other aspects of his debate with Hawthorne. 
Hawthorne argues, against Hirsch, that contemporary metaphysicians do not regard their theses as a 
priori but defend them “on the grounds of broad theoretical virtues like simplicity, reasonable 
conformity with common sense, and so on”; they thus, Hawthorne says, regard their theses as 
“quasi-empirical” ones, “whose tenuous connection to experience is not different in kind to that of 
various bits of high-level physical theory”.19 Hirsch’s (2009) reply is basically that whatever rhetoric 
metaphysicians may use, their actual arguments are paradigmatically a priori arguments. He 
comments, “…what Hawthorne must mean is that revisionary ontologists often adopt the 
speculative tone of high-level theorists rather than the tone of philosophers engaged in 
straightforward conceptual or linguistic analysis. That may well be, but their main arguments, 
whatever their speculative or theoretical tone, are a priori rather than empirical”.20 What is striking is 
that Hirsch contrasts being speculative or theoretical with being a priori.21 
                                                      
17 Hawthorne (2009), p. 214f. 
18 Hawthorne (2009), p. 217. 
19 Hawthorne (2009), p. 217. 
20 Hirsch (2009), p. 233. In his contribution to the present volume, Hirsch presents other replies to 
Hawthorne’s points. My aim here is not to adjudicate the Hirsch-Hawthorne dispute but to highlight an 
underlying assumption about the a priori. 
21 Hawthorne too contrasts the two, and one can also ask on what basis Hawthorne does this. (Does the fact 
that mathematics is speculative and that appeal to theoretical virtues play a role in mathematics contradict the 
claim that mathematics is an a priori science?)  
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Earlier I discussed Thomasson’s reliance on analyticity. There are also other ways in which 
Thomasson reasons like a rather traditional empiricist. Central to the metasemantic outlook that is at 
the heart of her deflationary metaontology is the idea that sortals come with “frame-level application 
conditions”, and that to see whether there are tables all one needs to do is to consider whether these 
frame-level application conditions are satisfied. The idea is that this is straightforward, so that doubts 
about whether there really are tables can be set aside. In connection with this she emphasizes that it 
is an empirical and not a philosophical issue whether the application conditions are fulfilled.22 While 
Thomasson does not explicitly invoke traditional empiricism, it helps explain how she reasons if we 
take traditional empiricism to be in the background: there is the ‘analytic’ question of what the 
application conditions associated with a given expression are and then the ‘empirical’ question of 
whether these conditions are fulfilled. Anyone who is more friendly toward a substantive a priori or 
who finds the a priori/empirical distinction less clear-cut will naturally be less friendly toward this 
assumption. 
Insofar as skepticism about ontology is driven by traditional empiricist concerns about ontology, 
the skepticism generalizes to other areas of philosophy. A traditional empiricist can agree that a priori 
inquiry is all right so long as it is supposed to issue only in analytic truths but be skeptical about those 
areas of philosophy that seem to be a priori even while the conclusions on the face of it seem like 
they cannot be analytic. For any such area, she would have to deny the appearance that the inquiry is 
a priori, or reject the whole inquiry as confused, or say that the conclusions are analytic, contrary to 
appearances. This all applies to, say, ethics as much as it applies to ontology. 
In sections 1 through 3 I have discussed some themes found in Carnap and discussed how they 
relate to what is going on in contemporary ontology. In the following sections I will discuss some 
themes found in contemporary ontology and discuss how they relate – or not – to Carnap. 
 
4. Verbal disputes 
Hirsch, probably the main contemporary skeptic of ontology, is often called “neo-Carnapian”, and 
Hirsch himself has occasionally referred to Carnap as an ally.23 (In his contribution to the present 
volume, Hirsch adds nuance by talking about “three degrees of Carnapian tolerance”.) There are two 
theses centrally discussed in the contemporary literature that both are associated with Hirsch.24 One 
is that ontological disputes are merely verbal; one is that our concept of existence is in no way 
                                                      
22 See Thomasson (2007), e.g. p. 195. 
23 For relevant passages in Hirsch, see the early pages of his (2005) and his (2008). For relevant references in 
other writers, see, e.g., Barnes (2009); Båve (2011), p. 104; Beebee, Effingham & Goff (2011), p. 125 (entry on 
Metametaphysics); and Hawley (2007), p. 237. 
24 Note the cautious formulation. Hirsch’s own views are rather subtle. I discuss how best to understand Hirsch 
in my (2011). For the purposes of comparing Carnap and the theses discussed in contemporary metaontology, 
it is more reasonable to focus on the general theses. 
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metaphysically privileged but is merely one among a number of different possible concepts of 
existence, none of which is privileged. In this section I will focus on the former claim, which, 
following Karen Bennett (2009), I will call semanticism. 
There is a significant unclarity in the claim that “ontological disputes are merely verbal”, one 
which remains even if we take it to be clear what it means for two particular speakers to engage in a 
verbal dispute. Once we resolve this unclarity it should no longer seem attractive to criticize the 
enterprise of ontology in the way envisaged. Focus on a dispute that a semanticist might characterize 
as “merely verbal”; say, the dispute between mereological nihilists, denying the existence of complex 
objects, on the one hand and friends of ordinary objects (“commonsensists”, let us call them) on the 
other. What might a semanticist mean in so characterizing it? Here are three different claims that 
could be made: (a) Looking at what actual nihilists and commonsensists actually say, it turns out that 
these actual theorists are merely speaking past each other, and have a verbal dispute. (b) For quite 
general reasons, nihilists and commonsensists, actual and hypothetical, will tend to speak past each 
other. (c) Nihilists and commonsensists for principled reasons always speak past each other.25  
If the semanticist’s claim were (a), then although her claim would be significant – she would 
show certain debates as actually prosecuted to be misguided – it wouldn’t be of principled significance: 
ontologists could in principle avoid these problems even if many contemporary ontologists fall afoul 
of them. Even if, say, Peter van Inwagen and David Lewis actually speak past each other, for instance 
because one of them fails to use ”there are tables” with the meaning it actually has in English, there 
certainly can for all that be more careful counterparts of them, both using ‘there are tables’ with its 
actual meaning, and having a dispute about whether the sentence thus understood is true. It is 
certainly of interest if main figures in ontological debates speak past each other, but as no reason has 
been given for thinking that there cannot be non-verbal ontological debates, no argument has been 
given to the effect that ontological disputes as such are not genuine.26 
Similar remarks apply to (b). To illustrate this, let me first take an example from elsewhere, the 
debate over which logic is the right logic. If someone – call him Graham27 – keeps assertively uttering 
sentences that when homophonically interpreted express something which we take to be obviously 
logically false (say, sentences of the form “S and not S”), then all else equal, there is (by ‘charity’) 
good reason to take him to mean something different by these sentences than we do. And this 
                                                      
25 If the semanticist is right, then it is of course wrong to speak of ‘nihilists’ and ‘commonsensists’ this way. 
What we have are those who say “there are no ordinary objects” and those who say “there are ordinary 
objects”, but the claim that the former hold that there are no ordinary objects and the latter hold that there are 
ordinary objects is precisely what is problematized. That said, in the main text I will for simplicity speak of 
‘nihilists’ and ‘commonsensists’. 
26 Hirsch’s view is not actually that no ontological disputes are genuine. The relevant claim in the context of 
discussion of Hirsch is rather that certain ontological questions are such that there can be no genuine disputes 
over them. 
27 Compare Priest (1987/2006). 
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generalizes beyond logic. As for instance Quine has stressed, generally, if our interpretation of 
someone takes her to be making assertions that are obviously false, then that is an important piece of 
evidence against the interpretation. This can in principle be used as an argument for why ontological 
disputes tend to be verbal. If one can also argue that the propositions expressed by the sentences 
fought over in ontological disputes are obviously true or false, one can argue that someone with a 
different view on one of these sentences should, all else equal, be taken to mean something different 
by it than what we do.28 
I’m only presenting this in broad outline. Both the principles of interpretation and the claims 
about the obviousness of ontological sentences can certainly be challenged. But never mind, for this 
is all beside the point anyway. Suppose, for argument’s sake, that the argument outlined works. Still, 
all it creates is a defeasible presumption that a given ontological dispute is merely verbal. For all that 
the argument shows, someone who assent (dissents) to sentences (pertaining to logic or ontology or 
what have you) that we take to express something obviously true (false) might still mean the same as 
we do by these sentences. Perhaps, if Graham not only says things of the form “S and not S”, but 
goes on to say, e.g., “I know it sounds odd. It is counterintuitive to me too; or at least it was so at 
first. But we’re simply forced to accept some of these claims. For consider the following paradox […] 
In light of this we have to give up some central and cherished belief, and I think, more specifically, 
that we must give up the belief that there are no true sentences of this form”. That might help tip the 
scales in favor of a homophonic interpretation. So long as it is possible for the scales to be thus 
tipped, it is possible to have a non-verbal dispute over which is the right logic. Analogous remarks 
apply in the case of ontological disputes. This brings us to (c), roughly, the view that it is impossible to 
have a dispute over the propositions expressed by ontological sentences: that whenever, both in actual 
and in hypothetical scenarios, it appears that two people have a disagreement over one of these 
propositions, that appearance is deceiving. That claim would be significant. But it is an implausibly 
strong claim, as should be agreed on all hands. Even in the case of logic, and someone apparently 
denying basic logical truths, it is implausible that appearances always are deceiving. 
So, to sum up: neither (a) nor (b) is strong enough to show that ontology per se, as opposed to 
particular token disputes between particular theorists, is to be dismissed; and (c) is implausibly strong. 
(a)-(c) seem to exhaust the relevant alternatives. So there is no interesting yet prima facie plausible 
claim to the effect that ontological disputes are non-substantive for the reason that they are merely 
verbal. (Again to stress, claims like (a) and (b) are themselves radical claims, and claims that promise 
                                                      
28 In his (1948), Quine stressed the obviousness of basic ontological claims. This together with Quine’s claim 
about correct interpretation yields semanticism (with the caveat that the claim about ontological sentences is 
from earlier work than the claims about interpretation). This is interesting in light of Quine’s status as someone 
who rehabilitated ontology as a serious enterprise. (I wouldn’t put too much theoretical weight on the point, 
but there is an element of irony to it.) 
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to be of some importance. It is their significance as far as the principled criticism of the enterprise of 
ontology is concerned that I am skeptical of.) 
I have discussed semanticism without attention to what Hirsch actually says. The excuse for that 
is that my criticism is principled, and not tied to any particular way of elaborating upon the basic 
semanticist idea.29 But it may anyway be useful to consider what Hirsch says. While Hirsch tends not 
to be explicit about whether he has in mind something like (a) or like (b) or like (c), or if there is 
some other alternative that he has in mind, it is easy as a reader to get the sense that of the 
alternatives mentioned, (c) is closest to what Hirsch is after given that he aims for a principled 
criticism. But when Hirsch makes remarks directly related to the issue I’m here bringing up, what he 
says is,  
 
Lewis points out that a stage seems eventually to be reached in ontology when “all is said and 
done”, when “all the tricky arguments and distinctions have been discovered”, so that each 
position has achieved a state of “equilibrium”. I am thinking primarily of this stage when I say that the 
dispute between endurantists and perdurantists is verbal. Prior to this stage, if an endurantist, say, is 
disposed to change her mind in response to some perdurantist arguments, then charity to use 
may favor interpreting her language as P-English, so that the change of mind is deemed 
reasonable and her earlier judgment deemed mistaken. But after the “all is said and done” stage 
has been reached, there is nothing to be said but that each side speaks the truth in their own 
language. In saying this I am rejecting Lewis’s claim that when we have reached the “all is said 
and done” stage we are left with a “matter of opinion” in which one side “is making a mistake of 
fact”.30  
 
What Hirsch seems to be saying is that his thesis is only that if an endurantist and a perdurantist – to 
stick with that example – would disagree even at the “when all is said and done” stage then their 
debate is merely verbal. But if Hirsch is really only concerned with debates that would remain at the 
“when all is said and done” stage, then it just isn’t clear how what he’s talking about applies to metaphysical 
debates as actually prosecuted. In order to show that actual metaphysical debates would remain at the “all 
is said and done” stage he would have to show that the disputants do not allow the same evidence as 
relevant, even when they are in possession of all the facts. But showing that is a tall order. How can 
one even reasonably go about that task? It is not sufficient to show that the disputants actually rely 
on different evidence. Second, to relate back to the remarks above on (a) and (b), even if all those 
who actually seem to disagree with me on ontological matters are such that our dispute would remain 
                                                      
29 Besides, as already noted, Hirsch’s own position is rather complex. See my (2011) for further discussion. 
30 Hirsch (2009), p. 241. 
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at the all-is-said-and-done stage, and hence by Hirsch’s reasoning our disagreement is merely verbal, 
it could still be that some possible opponent is such that we would agree at the all-is-said-and-done 
stage, and hence our disagreement is genuine. But can Hirsch then be thought to have a principled 
point against the enterprise of ontology? 
I have discussed three possible precisifications of “ontological disputes are merely verbal”. On 
the two first, the claim may be plausible but doesn’t have the generality required to undergird a 
dismissive attitude toward ontology. On the third, the claim just isn’t plausible. Accordingly, one 
cannot justify a dismissive attitude toward ontology by appeal to the idea that ontological disputes are 
verbal. Semanticism is not a good idea, if one seeks to present a principled critique of the very 
enterprise of ontology. But was Carnap a semanticist? Not in (1950). The topic of verbal disputes is 
not brought up there. The closest Carnap comes to discussing it is in this passage: 
 
Suppose that one philosopher says: “I believe that there are numbers as real entities. This gives 
me the right to use the linguistic forms of the numerical framework and to make semantical 
statements about numbers as designata of numerals”. His nominalistic opponent replies: “You 
are wrong; there are no numbers. The numerals may still be used as meaningful expressions. But 
they are not names, there are no entities designated by them. Therefore the word ‘number’ and 
numerical variables must not be used…” I cannot think of any possible evidence that would be 
regarded as relevant by both philosophers, and therefore…would decide the controversy or at 
least make one of the opposite theses more probable than the other…Therefore I feel compelled 
to regard the external question as a pseudo-question, until both parties to the controversy offer a 
common interpretation of the question as a cognitive question; this would involve an indication 
of possible evidence regarded as relevant by both sides.31 
 
Here Carnap brings up how the platonist and the nominalist would not regard the same evidence as 
relevant for settling the question. A natural further thought might have been: so the platonist and the 
nominalist are considering different questions. But that is not what Carnap goes on to say. He seems 
rather to think that the Platonist and the nominalist are concerned with the same thing – the external 
question – but what they are concerned with is a pseudo-question. He says “I feel compelled to 
regard the external question as a pseudoquestion” and seems to refer to the question supposedly at 
stake by “the external question”.  
There may however be reason to think that in his earlier (1935), Carnap is more sympathetic to 
the idea that ontological disputes are merely verbal. He there emphasizes the “language-relativity” of 
                                                      
31 Carnap (1950), p. 219. 
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philosophical theses. More specifically, he promotes the practice of always, when stating a 
philosophical thesis, being fully explicit about what language one is using. The reason this would be 
useful is that participants to philosophical disputes are apt to use different languages, without being 
aware that they are. Carnap brings up a hypothetical dispute between two philosophers. One of them 
says “numbers are classes of classes”. The other says “no, numbers are primitive objects, 
independent entities”.32 Carnap says that the theorists should first transpose their thesese into formal 
mode. The former theorist then says “numerical expressions are class-expressions of the second 
order” and the latter says “numerical expressions are not class-expressions, but elementary 
expressions”.33 But stated that way, Carnap says, the sentences are not complete: it must also be 
stated which languages they concern. When completed, the sentences would read something like “in 
L1, numerical expressions are class-expressions of the second order” and “in L2, numerical 
expressions are not class-expressions, but elementary expressions”.34 But then it is clear that the 
assertions are compatible with each other. Carnap only says that disputes sometimes vanish when stated 
this way. There is no explicit claim to the effect that this move by itself makes all ontological disputes 
go away; nor do I see such a claim being implied. 
I mentioned earlier that to have significant consequences for ontology, the basic language 
pluralist idea must be supplemented by other ideas; and given that Carnap, assuming the language 
pluralist interpretation, thought that language pluralism had significant consequences, he must have 
made some such supplementary assumption. Semanticism might be held to amount to one possible 
such assumption. One possible reason for stressing that there is a multitude of possible languages is 
that it can then be seen to be plausible that different disputants use different languages. However, as 
noted, the attribution of semanticism to Carnap is problematic. Moreover, it is not clear how appeal 
to semanticism could be linked to emphasizing the distinction between internal and external 
questions. 
 
5. Quantifier variance 
A thesis which often gets discussed together with the idea that ontological disputes are verbal is that 
of quantifier variance: the claim that there are different concepts of existence, which all are equally good 
– there is no metaphysically privileged concept of existence. It is no accident that the theses are 
discussed together. As mentioned, they were both brought into prominence in the recent 
metaontological literature by Eli Hirsch. And if the thesis of quantifier variance is true, a friend of the 
idea that ontological disputes are verbal may naturally further suggest that the disputants use 
                                                      
32 Carnap (1935), p. 76. 
33 Carnap (1935), p. 76f. 
34 Carnap (1935), p. 77. 
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expressions expressing different ones among the different concepts of existence postulated by the 
thesis of quantifier variance. But clearly, the theses should be distinguished. For example, even if my 
critical points concerning verbal disputes are sound, they in no way impugn the thesis of quantifier 
variance. 
However, an important qualification must be made. While some of Hirsch’s statements of the 
thesis of quantifier variance suggest the thesis characterized in the text – and while the quantifier 
variance thesis characterized in the text is what is discussed by other theorists, such as Chalmers 
(2009), Hawthorne (2006), Eklund (2007, 2009), and Sider (2007, 2009), it isn’t at all clear that this 
thesis is what Hirsch actually has in mind by ‘quantifier variance’. For example, in his (2008), Hirsch 
says the following: 
 
...the deeper reason for bringing in the imagined communities is to illustrate the possibility of 
“quantifier variance”. It often seems that an implicit assumption of revisionary ontology is that 
there is only one possible use of quantifier-like expressions in any languages. If that were so, a 
charitable interpretation of the quantifiers in our language might become moot. By considering 
the different imagined communities, consisting of non-philosophers who make assertions 
corresponding to the different ontological positions, we see that the assertions in all these 
communities are true. The ostensible disputes between these non-philosophical communities are 
merely verbal. That suffices to defend the commonsensical assertions made by the non-
philosophers in our community.35  
 
Here Hirsch seems to understand “quantifier variance” simply to amount to the claim that people 
can use “there is” and “exists” as his imagined communities do, and same-sounding sentences they 
employ mean different things. There is no call to ask about existence-like meanings, etc. Maybe we 
should interpret speakers of other communities as meaning something quite un-existence-like by 
“there is”. That doesn’t matter to the “quantifier variance” thesis here described. For as far as this 
thesis is concerned it isn’t the similarity between the meanings that is important; what is important is 
that people using ‘there is’ in the ways envisaged by Hirsch would mean different things. If that is all 
we mean by “quantifier variance” then much of what I say about quantifier variance in the main text 
is false. The reason for focusing on quantifier variance as characterized is that this is an importantly 
different thesis from semanticism, and one that has attracted considerable attention in the literature. 
Perhaps one might call quantifier variance as I introduced it strong quantifier variance, and quantifier 
                                                      
35 Hirsch (2008), p. 513. 
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variance as Hirsch now tends to make clear that he understands it is weak quantifier variance. When 
speaking of quantifier variance unqualified, it is the strong thesis I will have in mind.36 
The thesis of quantifier variance faces some immediate troublesome questions. What does it 
mean to say that there are different concepts of existence? Not that there are different concepts that 
could be expressed by the string of symbols ‘exists’, for that would be trivial. Nor, I take it, that there 
are different concepts that could be expressed by this string of symbols while it means what it 
actually means. There is only one concept this string could express while meaning what it actually 
means. (A complication is if ‘exists’ is somehow semantically indeterminate, but Hirsch does not 
purport to rely on any such claim.) It is not obvious how this dilemma can be evaded. Hirsch (2002) 
gestures toward the idea that what unifies the different concepts of existence is their inferential 
behavior: they satisfy the same rules of inference. But this runs up against the fact that if two 
expressions in the same language both satisfy the standard inference rules for the existential 
quantifier, then they are provably equivalent.37 This, together with the assumption that the supposed 
different concepts of existence should be able to cohabitate in the same language, leads to 
contradiction. (I do not here want to press this objection against quantifier variance. There may be 
good replies. The point is just to highlight some of the more obvious initial questions that arise.) 
Did Carnap believe in quantifier variance? The reason for thinking so would be that the different 
languages (or frameworks) he discussed would have to be thought of as employing different 
quantifiers, in the sense of the thesis of quantifier variance. But, first, it is not clear why Carnap 
would need anything more than the weak thesis of quantifier variance. And a further complication is 
this. When Carnap discusses different frameworks, he doesn’t explicitly discuss two frameworks each 
with tools for referring to and quantifying over numbers but such that “there are numbers” is true in 
one and false in another, and “there are” expresses existential quantification in each. Rather, the only 
framework he discusses with such tools is a platonist framework; a framework within which “there 
are numbers” comes out true. He does also discuss what a nominalist would say, but discusses only a 
nominalist who denies that seeming names of numbers are genuine names. It is consistent with 
everything Carnap says that he would also allow a nominalist framework where quantification over 
numbers is allowed, but such that “there are no numbers” simply comes out true in that framework. 
However, the text suggests the different view that in every language where quantification over 
numbers is allowed, such quantification is successful. The choice between frameworks is not a choice 
between a framework where quantification over numbers is allowed and successful and one where 
such quantification is allowed but unsuccessful; it is rather a choice between on the one hand 
                                                      
36 For more on these matters, see my (2011) review of Hirsch’s (2011). 
37 See e.g. Williamson (1987-8). 
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adopting a framework where quantification over numbers is allowed and successful, and on the other 
simply not allowing quantification over and reference to numbers. 
Even if Carnap does not subscribe to (strong) quantifier variance, he arguably, if he is a language 
pluralist, holds a view related to quantifier variance: a view according to which there simply are 
platonist languages and nominalist languages and that’s it – any claim to the effect that platonism or 
nominalism is somehow objectively privileged is bound to be mistaken. In other work (2009), I have 
presented a problem for this idea. Briefly, the problem is this. What sort of language is Carnap 
himself supposed to be using when expressing his view on the nominalist/platonist dispute? To see 
that there is a problem here, suppose Carnap were using a nominalist language. How could he, using 
this language, say both that the characteristically platonist sentences of the platonist language are (by 
his lights) true and that they are genuinely platonistic? He can maybe interpret them as true, by 
interpreting them as really not ontologically committing. But any such interpretation fails to yield that 
the supposedly platonist language is platonist. In his contribution to this volume, Richard Creath 
purports to respond to this argument on Carnap’s behalf. But he seems not to have appreciated the 
exact form of the argument. First, he insists, purportedly as agaist me, that Carnap is not committed 
to the idea of a universal metalanguage – but it is not part and parcel of my argument to insist that he 
is so committed. (One may, perhaps, suspect he does needs a universal metalanguage to state his 
philosophical views; but I don’t rely on this claim.) Second, Creath points to how the nominalist can 
interpret the platonist’s sentences such that they come out true. But even so, he fails to note that 
interpreted as he suggests those sentences, and the language of which they are part, can no longer be 
described as platonist.38 
Like semanticism, quantifier variance can be seen as one view on ontology building on language 
pluralism. The idea is that there is a plethora of different possible languages whose quantifiers have 
different meanings. But, again as in the case of semanticism, it is not plausible that Carnap subscribed 
to the idea of quantifier variance. All this goes back to the question of contemporary relevance of 
Carnap’s external/internal distinction. It may be suggested that semanticism and quantifier variance 
go along with language pluralism, and that there accordingly is some sort of connection. But the 
connection is rather tenuous, for language pluralism is not itself a very controversial idea. There 
would be a closer connection between Carnap and the contemporary discussion if there were 
significant similarities in the use made of the language pluralism, but no such significant similarities 
have been found.  
 
6. Naturalness 
                                                      
38 Creath (this volume), p. 5 of ms. 
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Given the way the debate over the thesis of quantifier variance is conducted, the dispute is between 
the quantifier variantist, who believes in a multitude of equally good quantifier meanings, and the 
ontological realist, who believes in a unique best quantifier meaning.39 An immediate question is what 
the goodness of a meaning – or, specifically, of a quantifier meaning – comes to. The standard way to 
spell it out is: a meaning is good to the extent that it is natural, or fundamental, or joint-carving. 
Carnap did not explicitly talk that about this; any claim about what Carnap would say about 
naturalness will have to be speculative. One immediate and straightforward speculation is that for 
Carnap, naturalness would be a metaphysical notion; and it is then just nonsense to speak of one 
meaning as more natural than another. This, however, does not automatically make Carnap a 
quantifier variantist. For he can still deny that there even is a multitude of quantifier meanings.  
A second speculation is this. (I don’t find it plausible myself, but I should mention it for 
completeness.) In an earlier quoted passage from his (1950), Carnap says, to repeat, 
 
I cannot think of any possible evidence that would be regarded as relevant by both philosophers, 
and therefore, if actually found, would decide the controversy or at least make one of the 
opposite theses more probable than the other. (To construe the numbers as classes or properties 
of the second level, according to the Frege-Russell method, does, of course, not solve the 
controversy, because the first philosopher would affirm and the second deny the existence of the 
system of classes or properties of the second level.) Therefore I feel compelled to regard the external 
question as a pseudo-question, until both parties to the controversy offer a common interpretation of the question as 
a cognitive question; this would involve an indication of possible evidence regarded as relevant by 
both sides.40  
 
The italicized part of this fits poorly with the tenor of the rest of the article. For Carnap otherwise 
gives the impression that external questions simply have to be pseudo-questions – no ifs and buts 
about it. But here Carnap seems to suggest that some work could be done, making the external 
question into something other than a mere pseudo-question. The remark fits so poorly with the rest 
of the article that one may wish to dismiss it as not seriously meant. But suppose we do take it 
seriously. What exactly is that that can be done to turn the external question into a cognitive 
question? 
It can be suggested: what theorists like Sider who speak of especially natural or joint-carving 
meanings appeal to is exactly what is called for here. While talk of what is natural or joint-carving 
                                                      
39 Sider (2009) characterizes ontological realism in the following passage: “there is indeed a single best 
quantifier meaning, a single inferentially adequate candidate meaning that (so far as the quantifiers are 
concerned) carves at the joints” (p. 397). 
40 Carnap (1950), p. 219; my emphasis. 
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may sound troublingly esoteric, Sider does provide criteria for when a meaning is joint-carving, and 
the criteria are of the right general kind to satisfy Carnapian scruples: what establishes a meaning as 
natural is, paradigmatically, an ideological indispensability argument: an argument to the effect that science 
cannot get by as well without employing an expression with this meaning. If some quantifier is thus 
indispensable, it is joint-carving. 
To stress, I am not endorsing the claim that Carnap would greet Sider’s suggestion with approval. 
What I am saying is precisely only that Sider’s suggestion fits the letter of what Carnap is asking for, 
since the kind of procedure Sider characterizes is one that promises to settle the issues at hand in a 
suitably scientific manner.  
 
7. Concluding remarks 
A few concluding remarks may be in order. I first discussed Carnap’s internal-external distinctions, 
his belief in analyticity and his commitment to verificationism and compared the contemporary 
literature. Then I turned to some ideas from the contemporary metaontological literature – 
semanticism, quantifier variance and the appeal to naturalness – and compared Carnap. The overall 
conclusion is the one stated earlier. Carnap’s importance for contemporary ontology is overstated. 
Moreover, to the extent that some contemporary themes are found already in Carnap, the 
contemporary discussions are just as problematic as Carnap’s own discussions were. 
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